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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This appeal involves a simple, straight-forward rule of law that is well established under 
Idaho Supreme Court precedent - that a plaintiff has no claim for wages under the Idaho Wage 
Claim Act unless and until compensation has been "earned" under the terms of a compensation 
agreement. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Karen L. Savage ("Savage") is a current sales employee of 
Defendant-Respondent Scandit Inc. ("Scandit"). In addition to receiving an annualized base 
salary of $101,000, Savage is a participant in a generous Commission Compensation Plan 
("CCP") that provides for commissions on Savage's licensing of Scandit software to customers. 
Under the CCP, commissions do not become "earned" until Scandit receives payment from the 
customer. However, the CCP provides that Scandit will pre-pay (i.e., advance) "unearned 
commissions" within approximately 30 days after the end of the month in which a sale has been 
formally booked. As made clear in the CCP, such pre-payments remain at all times subject to 
Scandit' s right to claw-back amounts that were prepaid but never earned. 
On September 27, 2016, Scandit and Amazon entered into a five-year Master Software 
License Agreement (the "Amazon Agreement") under which Amazon would pay Scandit an 
annual licensing fee in each of the next five years, unless Amazon exercises certain rights to 
terminate its software order under an exit clause. If Amazon pays its annual licensing fees over 
the next five years, Savage stands to earn commissions totaling approximately $400,000. 
However, under the express terms of the CCP, those commissions only become "earned" upon 
Scandit' s receipt of payments from Amazon. 
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Before Scandit received even the first annual payment from Amazon - and thus before 
Savage had earned any commission - Savage filed a Complaint for unpaid wages under the 
Idaho Wage Claim Act. In her Complaint, Savage contends that (1) she was entitled to the entire 
commission immediately upon execution of the Amazon Agreement; (2) the sale to Amazon 
entitled her to immediate payment of a $36,000 "annual" bonus, even though the year had not yet 
ended; and (3) she is entitled to treble damages under the Wage Claim Act. In short, despite the 
fact that Scandit had not received a single dollar from Amazon, Savage filed a wage claim 
seeking to turn $400,000 of yet-to-be-earned commission potential over a five-year period into 
an immediate judgment of more than $1,200,000. 
Under the Wage Claim Act, a claim for unpaid wages cannot exist unless and until a 
wage is "earned," and - as Idaho law makes clear - a commission wage is not earned until the 
contingencies established in an employer's contract have been satisfied. Here, the CCP 
expressly provides that "commissions shall become earned .. . only upon ... actual receipt of 
payment from the customer." 
Savage has not and cannot state a claim for unpaid wages because, as Savage concedes, 
Scandit had not received any payment from Amazon at the time Savage filed her Complaint. 
Thus, Savage had not "earned" any commission under the terms of the CCP and no "wages" 
were due to Savage. Savage similarly cannot state a claim for unpaid wages in the form of a 
$36,000 annual bonus because an annual bonus, by its very nature, is not due before year end. 
Accordingly, the District Court correctly held that Savage failed to state a claim for unpaid 
wages under the Wage Claim Act. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2 
49000.0001.10216117.2 
B. Statement Of Undisputed Factsl 
Scandit is an enterprise mobility and data capture company that specializes in barcode 
scanning applications for businesses. R. 4-13 (Complaint, ,r 6). Scandit sells software and other 
products and services that allow its customers to rapidly build, deploy and manage mobile 
applications for smartphones, tablets and wearable devices. Id. Scandit employs Savage as a 
Senior Sales Executive. Id. at ,r 7. 
Savage's compensation terms are described in the CCP, which governs Savage's 
compensation for the year running from "January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016." R. 16-
24. As set forth in the CCP, Scandit pays Savage an annualized salary of $101,000. Id. In 
addition to that salary, the CCP provides for additional potential compensation in the form of 
bonuses and commissions. For example, the CCP provides for an "Annual Quota Achievement 
Bonus" of $36,000 "if the combined ['Annual Contract Value'] ofrenewals and Orders equals 
CHF 641,0012 or more." Id. at§ IV.E. The CCP also provides for commissions based on the 
monetary value of legally binding contracts and purchase orders secured with new and existing 
customers in Savage's territory. Id. at§§ II., IV. 
As set forth in the CCP, the earning of commissions and the pre-payment of unearned 
commissions are governed by two key concepts. First, the CCP expressly provides that no 
1 For purposes of a motion to dismiss and appellate review of the District Court's dismissal 
of Savage's Complaint, the Court considers Savage's non-conclusory and well-pled factual 
allegations to be true. This recitation of Savage's allegations should not be construed as an 
admission that any of Savage's factual allegations are true. 
2 Some of the monetary values in the CCP are referenced in Swiss Francs ("CHF"). As set 
forth in the CCP, the foreign exchange rate between United States Dollars and CHF is 0.9975 to 
1. All references to currency in this brief are to United States Dollars unless otherwise specified. 
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commissions become earned until Scandit receives payment from the customer: "Commissions 
shall become earned (i.e., not subject to recoupment or 'claw-back' by [Scandit]) only upon ... 
actual receipt of payment from the customer." Id. at§ IV (emphasis in original). Second, 
although commissions do not become "earned" until Scandit receives actual payment from the 
customer, the CCP provides that anticipated commission amounts will be "prepaid" as "soon as 
reasonably practicable following the booking of the order, and ideally no later than within 30 
days of the end of the month during which the transaction has been booked." Id. 
In short, the CCP contemplates that anticipated commissions will often be "prepaid" (i.e., 
advanced) before they are actually "earned." The CCP refers to such advances as "prepaid but 
unearned commission." Id. at§ IV (emphasis added). As the CCP repeatedly emphasizes, 
however, any "prepaid but unearned commission" must be returned to Scandit if Scandit does 
not receive payment from the customer. Id. ( emphasis added); see also id. at §V ("As discussed 
in Section IV, in the event Scandit does not recognize the revenue on an Order under generally 
accepted accounting principles ... or does not receive payment from the customer per the terms of 
the Order, any prepaid commissions will be reversed as described below."). 
On September 27, 2016, Scandit and Amazon entered into a five-year Master Software 
License Agreement (the "Amazon Agreement"), which requires Amazon to pay to Scandit an 
annual licensing fee in each of the next five years, unless Amazon exercises certain rights to 
terminate its software order under an exit clause. R. 6 (Complaint, ,r 16); R. 64-90. 
Savage's complaint alleges that the "Amazon Agreement was booked during late 
September 2016 by Scandit." R. 6 at ,r 18. Conspicuously absent from Savage's Complaint, 
however, is any allegation that Scandit received payment from Amazon - the critical event that 
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must occur before any commission is "earned" under the CCP. As Savage acknowledged in 
connection with a motion for leave to amend her Complaint, Amazon did not make its first of 
five annual payments until late-November 2016. See Reporter's Transcript, 16:6-17:3; 40:19-
22 ("[A]t the time the complaint was filed, I think we can establish as a matter of fact there was 
no actual payment by Amazon."); R. 141. Within a few days after Amazon signed the last of 
several contract documents and initiated its first payment, Scandit pre-paid Savage's commission 
in full. Id. 
C. Course Of Proceedings Below 
Savage filed a Verified Complaint for Collection of a Wage Claim under Idaho Code 
§ 45-601, et seq. ("Complaint") on November 1, 2016. R. 4-28. The Complaint contains three 
causes of action. First, it asse1is what is commonly known as a "wage claim" - a claim for 
unpaid wages under the Idaho Wage Claim Act, Idaho Code§ 45-601 et seq. Id. at~ 28-33. 
Even though Scandit had yet to receive payment from Amazon as required for any commission 
to be "earned" under the CCP, the primary basis of Savage's wage claim was that Scandit did not 
pay Savage a commission of $385,234 for the Amazon Order "on the date [it was] due." Id. The 
secondary basis of the wage claim is an allegation that, although 2016 had not yet ended, Scandit 
had not yet paid Savage an "Annual Quota Achievement Bonus" of $36,000. Id. Savage asserts 
that, under Idaho Code§ 45-615(2), the commission and bonus should be trebled, for a total 
claim of $1,263,702. Id. 
Second, Savage's Complaint asserts a declaratory judgment cause of action, which raises 
a variety of disputes related to the commission allegedly due from the Amazon Order. Id. at~~ 
34-40. Third, Savage's Complaint asserts a "Contract Claim for Commission Due," which 
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asserts that "the failure of Scandit to pay the Commission Due to [Savage] amounts to a breach 
of the Agreement." Id. at~~ 41-45. 
Scandit moved to dismiss Savage's wage claim pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b) for failure to 
state a claim. R. 44-90. Savage opposed that motion and also moved for leave to file an 
amended complaint. R. 94-102. After a hearing on February 6, 2017, the District Court (the 
Honorable Jason D. Scott) issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss and Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. R. 13 7-151. The parties 
thereafter stipulated to dismissal with prejudice of Counts 2 and 3 of Savage's Complaint. R. 
152-155. On April 17, 2017, the District Court issued a Judgment dismissing Savage's 
Complaint with prejudice. R. 161-162. Savage filed a Notice of Appeal on May 26, 2017. R. 
163-167. This appeal involves only Savage's wage claim as the other causes of action were 
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether Scandit is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 40 and 41and Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion to dismiss under LR. C.P. 12(b )( 6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. "In 
order to withstand a motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party must allege all essential elements of 
the claims presented." Johnson v. Boundary Sch. Dist. # 101, 138 Idaho 331,334 (2003). If the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts upon which the court could grant relief, the complaint should 
be dismissed. Id. "Although the non-movant is entitled to have his factual assertions treated as 
true ... , this privilege does not extend to the conclusions of law the non-movant hopes the court 
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to draw from those facts." Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 141 Idaho 129, 136 (2005) ("[T]he 
Court is not obligated to assume that a plaintiffs legal conclusions or arguments are also true."). 
"[T]he question then is whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of his 
claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief." Id. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court 
reviews de nova the District Court's 12(b)(6) order of dismissal. See ABC Agra, LLC v. Critical 
Access Group, Inc., 156 Idaho 781, 783 (2014). 
Although leave to amend is generally granted liberally, a motion to amend a complaint 
should not be granted where the proposed amendment would be a futile act. Eagle Equity Fund, 
LLC v. TitleOne Corp., 161 Idaho 355, 362 (2016) ("A court is not required to permit the 
amendment of a complaint where such amendment would be futile."). "In determining whether 
an amended complaint should be allowed, where leave of comi is required under Rule 15(a), the 
court may consider whether the new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by the 
amended complaint state a valid claim." Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First 
Nat'! Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175 (1991). Leave to file an amended complaint is properly 
denied "[i]f the amended pleading does not set out a valid claim." Id. "The grant or denial of 
leave to amend after a responsive pleading has been filed is a matter that is within the discretion 
of the trial court and is subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion." 
Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,205 (2002). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Savage's Wage Claim 
The District Court correctly dismissed Savage's claim for unpaid wages under the Wage 
Claim Act for failure to state a claim because, at the time Savage filed her Complaint, she had 
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not yet "earned" the disputed wages and they therefore were not "wages" due under the Wage 
Claim Act. 
1. The Wage Claim Act Applies Only to Claims for "Wages" 
The Wage Claim Act gives special "preferred" status to "wages" earned by employees. 
For example, wage claims receive a preference in insolvency proceedings such that they will be 
paid by insolvency trustees prior to other claims. See Idaho Code § 45-602. The Wage Claim 
Act also gives preferred status to wage claims in matters of execution and attachment. Id. at 
§ 45-605. Similarly, the Wage Claim Act prohibits employers from withholding wages from a 
paycheck without an employee's written authorization. Id. at§ 45-609. 
Although wage claims generally arise out of a contract, wage claims also receive special 
preference in terms of available remedies. As opposed to the actual and/or consequential 
damages that are the remedy for a breach of contract claim, a successful claim for unpaid wages 
can potentially result in either statutory penalties (LC. § 45-607) or treble damages. Id. at § 45-
615 (providing for "damages in the amount of three (3) times the unpaid wages found due and 
owing"). 
These special preferences do not apply to every claim brought by an employee against an 
employer. For example, a breach of contract claim brought by an employee for something other 
than wages does not fall within the Wage Claim Act. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Haney Seed Co., 114 
Idaho 628, 635 (Ct. App. 1988) (a claim for the cash value of a life insurance policy payable 
upon death or retirement does not fall within the Wage Claim Act because it is not a claim for 
wages earned by the employee). Accordingly, the first question in any claim brought under the 
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Wage Claim Act is whether the claim is for "wages." If not, the Wage Claim Act and its special 
remedies and preferences do not apply. Id. 
2. Compensation Must be "Earned" Before it is a "Wage" 
Idaho Code Section 45-601(7) defines "wages" as "compensation for labor or services 
rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece or 
commission basis." In interpreting that definition, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently 
held that all forms of compensation must be "earned" before they become "wages" for purposes 
of the Wage Claim Act. See Bilow v. Preco, Inc., 132 Idaho 23, 29 (1998) ("Wages, as defined 
by Whitlock, constitute 'compensation earned in increments as services are performed."') 
( emphasis added). Thus, a claim for compensation that has not yet been earned, but rather may 
be earned in the future, is not a claim for "wages" under the Wage Claim Act. See Moore v. 
Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 819-20 (2005) (explaining that "claims for future wages do not 
fall within the purview of the [Wage Claim Act]"). 
3. Employers may Define by Contract when Commissions Become Earned 
The question of when a commission becomes "earned" such that it is a "wage" under the 
Wage Claim Act is determined by contract. In Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 
Idaho 185 (2005), the Idaho Supreme Court held that an employer is free to contractually define 
when a commission is "earned" for purposes of the Wage Claim Act. In Bakker, an employee 
who sold resort property units signed a commission agreement providing that sales commissions 
would be earned only upon successful closing of escrow on units sold while the employee 
remained employed by the employer. Id. at 188. After termination of her employment, the 
employee filed a complaint under the Wage Claim Act, asserting a claim for commissions 
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allegedly due for the sale of units on which the employee started the sales process, but that did 
not close escrow until after her employment had been terminated. Id. 
The employee in Bakker attempted to rely on the common law rule that "a broker earned 
a commission when he procured a buyer 'ready, willing and able' to purchase property according 
to the seller's terms." Id. at 190. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that 
it was the parties' agreement- and not common law- that controlled when a commission 
became "earned," and thus a "wage," under the Wage Claim Act. Id. Specifically, the Court 
held that employers are free to "contract for the terms of compensation regarding when wages 
are earned and/or due." Id. Because under the terms of the commission agreement the employee 
in Bakker had not "earned" a commission at the time her employment was terminated, the 
employee had no claim for unpaid wages under the Wage Claim Act. Id. 
4. Under the CCP, Commissions are not "Earned" until Payment is Received 
As authorized by Bakker, the CCP defines exactly when commissions are "earned" and 
thereby become wages under the Wage Claim Act. Specifically, the CCP provides that 
"Commissions shall become earned (i.e., not subject to recoupment or 'claw-back' by [Scandit]) 
only upon ... actual receipt of payment from the customer." R. 18 at § IV (bold in original, 
underscoring added). 
Savage's commission-based wage claim is based on the erroneous assumption that she 
earned a commission on the Amazon Order at the time Scandit and Amazon entered into the 
Amazon Agreement and the deal was "booked." R. 6 at ,r,r 16-18. That assertion is contrary to 
the express terms of the CCP, which provides that Commissions are "earned" only upon receipt 
of payment from the customer. Amazon had not made any payment to Scandit at the time 
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Savage filed her Complaint. Thus, just like the employee in Bakker, Savage cannot state a wage 
claim under the Wage Claim Act because, at the time she filed her Complaint, she had not 
"earned" any commission under the clear terms of the CCP. Because Scandit had not been paid 
by Amazon, no commission had become "earned" and the amount claimed by Scandit was not a 
"wage" due under the Wage Claim Act. See Bakker, 141 Idaho at 190-9l(holding that Plaintiff 
had not "earned" her commission under the plain language of her contract and therefore had no 
"unpaid wages" and thus no claim under the Wage Claim Act). 
5. Pre-paid Commissions are Not Wages 
The fact that the CCP provides for prepayment of unearned commissions does not 
change this result. The CCP makes clear that any commissions "prepaid" after an order has been 
booked but before payment has been received by the customer are not yet "earned," but rather 
are "prepaid but unearned commission." R. 18 at§ IV (emphasis added). To this end, the CCP 
expressly states that (i) "paid but unearned commissions must be returned to Scandit," and "in 
the event Scandit does not recognize the revenue on an Order ... or does not receive payment 
from the customer per the terms of the Order, any prepaid commissions will be reversed." Id at 
,r,r IV, V. The CCP at all times distinguishes between when Scandit will pre-pay (i.e., advance) 
commission payments and when such commission payments in fact become earned. This 
distinction is critical and precludes a finding that prepaid commissions are "wages" due. 
In fact, courts around the country have recognized that advances are not "wages" under 
similar state wage acts. For example, the California Court of Appeals has explained: 
The essence of an advance is that at the time of payment the 
employer cannot determine whether the commission will 
eventually be earned because a condition to the employee's right to 
the commission has yet to occur or its occurrence as yet is 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 11 
49000.0001.10216117.2 
otherwise unascertainable. An advance, therefore, by definition is 
not a wage because all conditions for performance have not been 
satisfied. 
Steinhebel v. Los Angeles Times Commc 'ns, 126 Cal. App. 4th 696, 704-06 (2005); see also 
Gress v. Fabcon, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ( commission payments in the form 
of "unearned advance payment for jobs shipped but not completed" do not constitute "wages" 
because the commission payments have not yet been earned); Morangelli v. Chemed Corp., 922 
F. Supp. 2d 278, 293-297 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing a nine-state class action lawsuit because, 
under the law of all nine states, "advances" are not "wages" and no wage claim can exist until 
commissions have been "earned" as defined in a compensation agreement). 
Savage argues that cases from California are distinguishable because the California wage 
statute includes the term "earned" in its definition of wages. That argument ignores the fact that 
the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently held that compensation must be 
"earned" before it is a wage. Moreover, the Idaho Wage Claim Act expressly recognizes the 
distinction between wages that have been earned and an "advance of wages" that have not yet 
been earned, permitting employers to advance unearned wages. Idaho Code Section 45-608, in 
the sentence immediately following that under which Savage brings her claim, provides that 
employers may deposit "wages due or to become due or an advance of wages to be earned" in 
an employee's bank account. Id (emphasis added). Idaho law therefore explicitly recognizes 
that advances are not wages. The CCP ultimately does precisely what Idaho Code Section 45-
608 authorizes - it provides for an advance of wages that have not yet been earned. 
Savage next attempts to distinguish these authorities by arguing that the CCP does not 
expressly use the term "advance." That argument, however, puts form over substance and 
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ignores the clear terms of the CCP, which uses the unambiguous phrase "prepaid but unearned 
commission," which is synonymous with an advance. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (defining "prepay" as "to pay in advance"); Dictionary.com 
Unabridged, Random House, Inc. 1 Feb. 2017 (defining "prepay" as "to pay for in advance") 
(available at http://www.dictionary.com/browse/prepay); BURTON'S LEGAL THESAURUS (2nd Ed. 
1992) (listing, as synonyms for "prepay", the following: "give compensation for in advance, 
make payment in advance, ... [and] pay in advance"). 
Notably, Savage cites no authority to support her argument that the difference in 
terminology is in any way legally meaningful. Instead, she relies on a California case, Harris v. 
Investor's Bus. Daily, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 4th 28 (2006), to argue that the CCP does not provide 
for an advance, but rather a "commission subject to a condition subsequent" that constitutes a 
"wage." See Appellant's Brief, p. 23. 
Harris is not helpful to Savage's position. Harris involved a dispute over whether a 
commission previously paid to an employee was a "wage" that had already been earned or an 
"advance" on a commission that had not yet been earned. That distinction mattered because 
California law prohibits employers from taking back "wages" that have been earned but does not 
prohibit recoupment of an "advance." Just like the Idaho Supreme Court in Bakker, the 
California court focused on whether the commission had been "earned" under the terms of the 
commission agreement between the parties. The court explained that, if "a condition to the 
employee's right to the commission had yet to occur, an advance was not a wage." Id. at 41. 
However, if the "commission was earned at the time of sale ... the money paid for commissions 
is wages, not an advance." Id. at 40. The court held that the commission in question was a 
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"wage" and not an "advance" because, under the terms of the commission agreement, the 
commission was "earned at the time of the sale, not at some designated point in the future." Id. 
at 41 ( emphasis added). 
Harris does not help Savage because, unlike the commission agreement in Harris, the 
CCP expressly provides that no commission is earned until receipt of funds from the customer 
and that any payment made to an employee before that time is merely a "prepaid but unearned 
commission" (i.e., an advance). See Deleon v. Verizon Wireless, LLC, 207 Cal. App. 4th 800, 
803 (2012) (explaining that "Harris is inapposite" where an employee's compensation plan 
"clearly and expressly stated the retail sale representative's commissions were not earned at the 
time of sale of the cell phone service plan and referred to commission payments as 'advances"'). 
Contrary to Savage's vague assertions, this case does not turn on some distinction 
between an "advance" and a "commission subject to a condition subsequent." In fact, neither 
Harris nor any other case cited by Savage so much as mentions the concept of a condition 
subsequent. "A condition subsequent is a condition that, if performed or violated, as the case 
may be, defeats the contract, or one that, if not met by one party, abrogates the other party's 
obligation to perform." Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 153 
Idaho 716,725,291 P.3d 399,408 (2012). "Thus, a contract that is conditioned to become void 
on a specified event is one subject to a condition subsequent." Id. 
The CCP does not contain a condition subsequent. Instead, as authorized by Bakker, it 
provides that no commission is earned until actual receipt of payment from a customer. The 
whole point of Bakker (and Harris for that matter) is that a commission is not "earned," and thus 
not a "wage," until any contingency in the parties' commission agreement has been satisfied. 
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See Bakker, 141 Idaho at 191. Bakker refers to such a contingency as a "condition precedent" to 
earning a commission, and holds that no wage claim exists until all contractual contingencies to 
earning a wage have been satisfied. Bakker, 141 Idaho at 192. 
6. Savage's "Arithmetically Ascertainable" Theory is Not Supported by Idaho 
Law 
Idaho law does not support Savage's contention that commissions become "wages" due 
under the Wage Claim Act as soon as they are "arithmetically ascertainable," nor does any case 
cited by Savage so hold. Rather, the cases cited by Savage reference the question of whether an 
alleged commission is "ascertainable" as only a preliminary issue in the determination of 
whether a commission has become earned, not as the deciding factor. 
Savage's reliance on Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303 (2000), is misplaced. Polk 
involved an employment contract that promised an employee a "5% commission on every home 
sold by the company" and "a 20% share of the profits of the company." Id. at 307. Unlike the 
CCP, the contract in Polk did not contain any conditions that had to occur before the employee 
would be deemed to have earned a commission on the sold houses. When the employer in Polk 
fired the employee and refused to pay commissions at the time of termination despite the houses 
having been sold, the jury determined that $18,698 in commissions was due and owing to the 
employee upon termination. Id. After trial, when the employer argued against trebling of the 
unpaid commissions on the ground that the commission amount was disputed and not 
"ascertainable" until the jury had determined it, the Court disagreed, reasoning that the jury's 
verdict was a determination that the commission "was due at the time the Polks terminated their 
employment." Id. at 309. The conclusion in Polk that the earned but unpaid commissions were 
wages did not hinge on the fact that they were ascertainable, nor did the Court hold that any 
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commission is due and payable as soon as it becomes ascertainable. Instead, the question of 
whether the commissions were ascertainable was merely a preliminary inquiry to the ultimate 
question of whether the commissions were due and owing at the time of termination of 
employment (which question would be answered by the terms of the employee's commission 
plan). Id. 
Savage's reliance on Meschino v. Frazier Indus. Co., 2016 WL 4083342 at *4 (D. Mass. 
Aug. 1, 2016) is similarly unhelpful to her cause. Savage cites Meschino for the proposition that 
commissions are "earned" under the Massachusetts Wage Act when the commission becomes 
"arithmetically ascertainable." See Appellant's Brief, p. 19. But that is not what Meschino 
holds. While Meschino explains that a commission must be "mathematically ascertainable" 
before it can be earned, it makes clear that the ultimate test is whether a commission has been 
"earned" under the terms of the employment agreement. Id. Conveniently omitted from 
Savage's briefing is the critical holding of the Meschino decision: "When a compensation plan 
specifically sets out the contingencies an employee must meet to earn a commission, courts 
apply the terms of the plan." Id. Thus, to determine whether a wage has been "earned," a court 
must look to "the plain meaning of the definition of earned commissions set out in the 
Employment Agreement." Id. at *5. 
Savage's reliance on Meschino is peculiar because its fact pattern and ultimate conclusion 
so closely mirror and support the District Court's conclusion here. Just like Savage, the 
employee in Meschino asserted that he was entitled to commissions within a ce1iain amount of 
time after a sale had been "booked." Id. The court rejected that argument because the 
employment agreement did not provide that commissions were earned upon booking of a sale. 
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Instead, the employment agreement provided that commissions became earned only upon client 
payment. Id. The court therefore held that the employee had not established a claim for unpaid 
wages because he had "not offered any evidence of client payments." Id. 
The Massachusetts standard is consistent with Idaho law as explained in Bakker. While 
courts may address whether commissions are ascertainable as a preliminary inquiry, the ultimate 
question is whether commissions have been "earned" under the terms of the applicable 
agreement between the parties. See Bakker, 141 Idaho at 190. 
7. Savage Cannot State a Claim for Unpaid Wages Because Amazon had Not 
Made Any Payment at the Time Savage Filed her Complaint 
Savage contends that the District Court "applied the wrong legal standard" by analyzing 
whether Savage had "earned" a commission. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 34-35 ("[T]he correct 
legal standard for determining whether a commission is 'wages' under the IWCA is not whether 
the commission is 'earned.'"). With all due respect, Savage is wrong. As the Idaho Supreme 
Court held in Bakker, all forms of compensation must be "earned" before they become "wages" 
and the parties can define by contract when a commission is "earned" for purposes of the Wage 
Claim Act. See Bakker, 141 Idaho at 190. 
The District Court correctly applied Bakker in dismissing Savage's wage claim. Just like 
the employee agreement at issue in Bakker, the CCP defines precisely when Savage's 
commissions become "earned." Specifically, the very first line in the commissions section of the 
CCP provides that "Commissions shall become earned (i.e., not subject to recoupment or "claw-
back" by [Scandit]) only upon ... actual receipt of payment from the customer." R. 16 at§ IV 
(bold in original, underscoring added). Because Scandit had not been paid by Amazon at the 
time Savage filed her Complaint, Savage had not earned any commission under the plain 
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language of the CCP and therefore cannot state a claim for unpaid wages under the Wage Claim 
Act. 
Savage's argument to the contrary is based on selective quotations and violates rules of 
contract interpretation. Savage asks the Court to look only to one line in the third paragraph of 
the commissions section of the CCP, which provides that "100% of the respective commission 
will be paid as soon as reasonably practicable following the booking of the order." R. 18 at§ IV. 
Not only does that quote not reference earned commissions, but Savage takes the quote out of 
context and in violation of the rule that a contract must be interpreted as a whole. See St. Clair v. 
Krueger, 115 Idaho 702, 705 (1989) ("In interpreting any provision of a contract, however, our 
cases indicate that the entire agreement must be viewed as a whole."). 
As set forth unambiguously in the CCP when viewing the contract as a whole, the 
earning of commissions and the pre-payment of unearned commissions are governed by two 
different standards. First, the CCP expressly and unambiguously provides that no commission 
becomes "earned" until, among other requirements, "actual receipt of payment from the 
customer." R. 18 at § IV. 
Second, although commissions do not become "earned" until Scandit receives payment 
from a customer, the CCP provides that anticipated commission amounts will be "prepaid" as 
"soon as reasonably practicable following the booking of the order, and ideally no later than 
within 30 days of the end of the month during which the transaction has been booked." Id. As 
the CCP repeatedly emphasizes, any such payment is considered a "prepaid but unearned 
commission" (i.e., an advance) until the commission has been "earned" upon receipt of payment 
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from the customer. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at§ V. Under Bakker, those advances are 
not "wages" because no commission has yet been "earned." 
The District Court correctly dismissed Savage's wage claim under the Wage Claim Act 
because Savage did not allege (nor could she) that Scandit had received payment from Amazon 
at the time she filed her Complaint. Thus, Savage had not "earned" any commission under the 
unambiguous terms of the CCP and no "wages" were due to Savage at the time she filed her 
Complaint. At best, Savage alleges that Scandit was late in providing her with an advance on a 
potential commission she had not yet earned. As a matter of law, such an allegation does not 
state a claim for "wages" under the Wage Claim Act, and the district court was correct in 
dismissing this claim. See Owsley, 141 Idaho at 136 (dismissal is appropriate if the plaintiff has 
not "alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief'). 
B. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Savage's Wage Claim Based on the Annual 
Quota Achievement Bonus 
The CCP provides for an "Annual Quota Achievement Bonus" of $36,000 "if the 
combined ['Annual Contract Value'] of renewals and Orders equals CHF 641,001 or more." R. 
20 at§ IV.E. Savage's Complaint asserts that Savage achieved her annual quota upon booking 
of the Amazon Order in September 2016 and that Scandit was required to pay the bonus 
immediately thereafter. R. 8 at ,r 27, 33, Appellant's Brief, p. 31. Specifically, even though 
2016 had not yet ended, Savage contends that her Annual Quota Achievement Bonus became 
due immediately upon booking of the Amazon Order and that Scandit violated the Wage Claim 
Act by waiting to pay the annual bonus until the end of the year. Id. 
The District Court correctly dismissed Savage's claim because there is no contractual 
basis for Savage's assertion that the Annual Quota Achievement Bonus came due several months 
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before the end of the year. To the contrary, everything about the Annual Quota Achievement 
Bonus makes clear that it comes due, if achieved, at the end of the year. 
First and foremost, it is telling that Savage attempts to relabel and mischaracterize the 
bonus as an "Achievement Bonus." See R. 6 at, 14; Appellant's Brief, p. 28. The CCP in fact 
calls it an "Annual Quota Achievement Bonus." R. 20 at§ IV.E (emphasis added). The bonus 
is based on the "Annual Contract Value" of sales over the 2016 year compared to Savage's 
"Annual Quota." Id. at§§ IV.E, II (emphasis added). The CCP repeats the "annual" nature of 
the bonus no fewer than four times throughout the document. See id. at§§ I(F), IV(E) and App. 
A§§ 1, 5. Moreover, the Annual Quota Achievement Bonus is included as part of an agreement 
entitled "2016 Commission Compensation Plan" that is expressly defined to encompass the term 
from "January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016." Id. at page 1 (emphasis added). Thus, the 
only logical interpretation is that the Annual Quota Achievement Bonus becomes due, if 
achieved, at the conclusion of the annual term. 
Indeed, by its very nature, an annual bonus is earned on an annual basis and paid at the 
end of the year. See, e.g., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND COMPENSATION GUIDE (CCH 2016), 4332, 
2015 WL 8407980 ("As the name suggests, [annual bonuses] are paid out on a yearly 
basis .... Even when annual bonuses are based on employee performance, they are long-delayed 
rewards for what may have been excellent work at the beginning of the year."); Black's Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "Annual" as "1. Occurring once every year; yearly ... 2. Of, 
relating to, or involving a period of one year"); Boesel v. Swaptree, Inc., 31 Mass.L.Rptr. 55, 
2013 WL 7083258, at *4 (Mass. Super. Dec. 23, 2013) ("The word 'Annual' further describes 
that the Annual Bonus was to be paid once based upon a full year's employment .... the plain 
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language describing the bonus as "Annual" means that the payment of the bonus was contingent 
upon Boesel earning it by continuing employment for the full calendar year."). 
Despite the very nature of an annual bonus, and despite the lack of any contractual basis 
for a due date partway through the year, Savage insists that she should not have to wait even 
"one second after the quota figure has been achieved before the [Annual Quota] Achievement 
Bonus becomes due and payable." See Appellant's Brief, p. 31. Not only does that position find 
no support in the CCP, but it would produce absurd results. See United States v. Irvine, 756 F.2d 
708, 710 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The language of the contract is to be read as a whole and given a 
reasonable interpretation, not an interpretation that would produce absurd results.") (citation 
omitted). 
Annual bonuses are a very common component of compensation and are generally based 
on company sales, profitability or an employee's individual production. For example, law firms 
often have policies under which associate attorneys are eligible for an annual bonus if they bill 
1800 hours during the year. Under Savage's theory, an associate would be entitled to payment of 
such an annual bonus on the very day that she bills her 1800th hour. If the associate bills the 
1800th hour on November 30th, but is not paid the "annual" bonus that very day on her November 
paycheck, she could sue for treble damages on December 1st. A ruling in favor of Savage would 
incentivize employees to file "Gotcha!" lawsuits for treble damages the very day after they think 
their annual bonus becomes "arithmetically ascertainable" in an attempt to convert a generous 
annual bonus into a treble damage windfall. 
In addition to en-oneously attacking the district court's finding that that payment of the 
Annual Quota Achievement Bonus was not due before the end of the year, Savage also 
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incorrectly criticizes the District Court's reliance on the CCP's quota credit reversal provision as 
a secondary basis for dismissal of her annual bonus claim. While that analysis is not necessary 
to affirm dismissal of the annual bonus claim, the District Court's analysis was correct. The 
Annual Quota Achievement Bonus is based on the achievement of an "Annual Quota" for sales 
in the amount of CHF 641,001. R. 20 at § IV .E. The CCP provides that, "[i]f a receivable 
remains uncollected for over 60 days from the due date, Scandit reserves the right to reverse all 
Quota credit and prepaid commission corresponding to the portion of the Order for which 
payment has not been received." Id. at§ V (emphasis added). 
Savage erroneously asserts that this provision applies only to reverse commission 
advances, but not Quota credit toward the Annual Quota Achievement Bonus. To the contrary, 
the provision expressly states that uncollected receivables result in reversal of both (1) "Quota 
credit" and (2) "prepaid commission." Given that the Annual Quota Achievement Bonus is 
based on achievement of an annual quota, reversal of any "Quota credit" impacts whether the 
Annual Quota Achievement Bonus has been earned and further highlights the absurdity of 
Savage's contention that she was entitled to the Annual Quota Achievement Bonus the very 
second the Amazon Order was booked. 
In any event, as the District Court made clear, its quota reversal analysis was merely a 
secondary basis for dismissal and does not impact the District Court's primary conclusion that 
payment of the Annual Quota Achievement Bonus was not due before the end of the year. R. 
148 ("[E]ven if there is some flaw in the Court's logic that the annual bonus wasn't even 
'earned' before year's end [because of the potential for Quota credit reversal], it nevertheless is 
true that payment of the annual bonus didn't come due before year's end."). 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF-22 
49000,0001.10216117.2 
C. The District Court Correctly Denied Savage's Motion for Leave to File a First 
Amended Complaint 
In response to Scandit's motion to dismiss, Savage sought leave to file a First Amended 
Complaint. R. 94-102. The proposed First Amended Complaint does not add any material 
factual allegations. Instead, it asserts estoppel theories and claims that Scandit waived the 
contractual contingency that Scandit receive payment from a customer before any commission is 
earned. R. 97-102. The District Court correctly denied Savage's motion because the proposed 
First Amended Complaint is futile. See Eagle Equity Fund, LLC v. TitleOne Corp., 161 Idaho 
355, 362 (2016) (noting that although leave to amend is generally granted liberally, a motion to 
amend a complaint should not be granted where the proposed amendment would be a "futile" 
act). 
The District Court dismissed Savage's initial Complaint because it did not allege that 
Scandit received payment from Amazon - the critical event that must occur before any 
commission is "earned" under the CCP. Savage's proposed First Amended Complaint is futile 
because it does not address that fatal flaw. To the contrary, Savage concedes that Amazon did 
not make even its first of five annual payments until late-November 2016, well after she filed her 
Complaint. See Reporter's Transcript, 40:19-22. 
As the District Court correctly concluded, the equitable theories asserted in the proposed 
First Amended Complaint are also futile. To establish a waiver, two elements must be met: (1) 
an intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, and (2) detrimental reliance. See 
Washington Fed. Sav. v. Van Engelen, 153 Idaho 648, 655 (2012). Under the first element, the 
party asse1iing waiver has the burden to show a clear intent to waive. Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 719 (2014). Waiver will not be inferred 
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absent "a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to 
estoppel." Id. Under the second element, "the party asserting waiver must also show that he 
acted in reasonable reliance upon [the waiver] and that he thereby has altered his position to his 
detriment." Id. 
Savage's proposed First Amended Complaint does not allege facts that would support 
either element of a waiver theory. First, Savage points to no act by Scandit demonstrating an 
unequivocal intent to waive the CCP's requirement that Scandit receive payment from Amazon 
before any commission is "earned." The October 28, 2016 email relied upon by Savage (R. 26-
28) does not evidence a waiver. To the contrary, it expressly states that Savage's commission 
remains unearned unless and until Scandit receives payment from Amazon. Id. ( explaining that 
pre-payment of unearned commissions could result in a situation where Scandit "would have to 
reverse any previous commission payment and claw back previously paid commission" and 
explicitly "maintaining the claw back option" for prepaid but unearned commissions). 
Moreover, Savage cannot contend that she relied to her detriment on the email. Scandit 
sent the email on October 28, 2016 - after the sale to Amazon, but before Amazon had paid 
Scandit any amount under the Agreement. Id. Savage filed her Complaint just two business 
days later, thereby making impossible any argument that she relied to her detriment on the email. 
The proposed First Amended Complaint similarly fails to allege facts supporting an 
equitable estoppel theory, the elements of which are: "(1) a false representation or concealment 
of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting 
estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or 
concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the 
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representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the 
representation or concealment to his prejudice." Washington Fed. Sav. v. Van Engelen, 153 
Idaho 648, 655 (2012). 
The proposed First Amended Complaint does not identify any false representation or 
concealment of a material fact. The October 28th email certainly contains no such 
misrepresentation. Rather, it reaffirms the terms of the CCP. Moreover, as explained above, 
Savage cannot establish that she relied to her detriment on the email. 
Finally, Savage has not alleged facts to support a quasi-estoppel claim, the elements of 
which are: "(1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original position, and 
(2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; 
(b) the other party was induced to change positions; or ( c) it would be unconscionable to permit 
the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a 
benefit or acquiesced in." Id. 
Savage has not identified any inconsistent position taken by Scandit. The email in 
question is consistent with both the CCP and Scandit' s position in this litigation in stating that 
commissions are not earned until payment is received from Amazon. 
In summary, because Savage's proposed amendments fail to allege the essential elements 
of her claims, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Savage's motion for leave 
to file an amended complaint. See Eagle Equity Fund, LLC v. TitleOne Corp., 161 Idaho 355, 
362 (2016). 
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D. Savage's Reliance on Scandit's November Pre-Payment of the Unearned 
Commission is a Red Herring 
On multiple occasions in her briefing, Savage references the fact that Scandit pre-paid the 
commission in full in late-November 2016. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 8, 21-22. Savage raises 
that fact in an attempt to manufacture an inference that Scandit paid the commission at that time 
in response to Savage's lawsuit and out of fear that it had somehow violated the Wage Claim 
Act. Id. While Savage's assertion is false and misleading, it serves to highlight the question of 
law at the heart of this case. 
As an initial matter, Savage's assertion is premised on a misunderstanding of not only the 
conditions required before a commission is earned, but also the conditions required before even 
an advance will be prepaid. As explained in more detail above, the prepayment and earning of 
commissions are based on two separate events. First, "unearned" commissions are "prepaid" 
upon "booking" of an order. Second, commissions are "earned" only upon receipt of payment 
from the customer. 
The fact of the matter is that Scandit prepaid Savage in late-November 2016 because that 
is when the Amazon Agreement was actually booked. The CCP provides that a contract is not 
"booked" - the event that triggers prepayment of "unearned commissions" - until several criteria 
are met, including execution of a "contract, schedules and other associated documentation." R. 
18 at§ IV(i). Moreover, "[i]fthere are any contingencies (e.g., exit clauses) in the arrangement 
with the customer, Scandit reserves the right not to book the sale and withhold [prepayment of 
the unearned] commission until the contingency has expired." Id. 
The Amazon Agreement contains an express exit clause that would allow Amazon to 
terminate its software order under specified conditions without any payment obligation to 
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Scandit. Specifically, the Amazon Agreement and Software Order No. 1 contemplate that 
various parties and non-parties would execute a mutually agreeable escrow agreement and that 
Scandit would deliver the applicable source code to an escrow agent within sixty (60) days after 
executing Software Order No. 1, i.e., by November 26, 2016. See R. 69, 88 (Amazon 
Agreement, 1 9 .1; Software Order No. 1, 1 11 ). Under the terms of the Amazon Agreement's 
exit clause, any failure to satisfy the November 26th deadline would allow Amazon to terminate 
the Amazon Agreement, without any obligation to Scandit. Id. 
While executing a mutually agreeable escrow agreement sounds simple, it turned out not 
to be. The escrow agreement proposed by Savage was rejected and the exit clause deadline was 
not met. Rather than exercise its exit clause rights, Amazon agreed to extend the November 26th 
deadline at Savage's request. A few days later, an escrow agreement was fully executed, the 
software code was delivered and Amazon initiated its first of five annual payments. The 
Amazon order was "booked" under the terms of the CCP when the exit clause was satisfied. 
Accordingly, Scandit pre-paid3 Savage's commission a few days later. 
Importantly, the outcome of this case does not depend on when the Amazon Order was 
booked. Indeed, when the booking occurred is hTelevant, and that issue is not before the Court 
and need not be addressed. However, the distinction between when "prepaid but unearned 
commissions" are advanced (upon "booking") and when the commission is earned (upon "actual 
receipt of payment from the customer") highlights the question of law squarely before the Court 
3 Most of that payment was still "prepaid but unearned commission," as opposed to wages, 
because Amazon had paid only its first of five annual payments. The commission will become 
earned over five years if and when Amazon makes it annual payments. 
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- whether Savage's claim that she was owed an advance supports a claim for "wages" due under 
the Wage Claim Act. 
Savage's complaint is based entirely on the assertion that the Amazon Order was 
"booked" in September 2017. R. 6 at ,r 17. Even assuming that allegation to be true, the 
booking of an order triggers only the advance of "prepaid but unearned commissions," which 
are not "wages" under the Wage Claim Act because they have not yet been "earned." At best, 
Savage might be able to assert a weak contract claim if she could somehow establish damages. 4 
However, because Scandit had not received payment from Amazon at the time Savage filed her 
Complaint, Savage has no claim for wages under the Wage Claim Act. 
Finally, adopting Savage's position would likely result in employers abandoning the 
practice of advancing commissions to employees. See Deleon v. Verizon Wireless, LLC, 207 
Cal. App. 4th 800, 803, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810, 812-13 (2012) (dismissing wage claim because 
"commission advances are not wages" and noting that a contrary conclusion "might result in the 
loss of a benefit to the retail sales representatives" in the form of "access to cash rather than 
having to wait for the contingencies to occur"). Savage's attempt to take advantage of Scandit's 
generous advance practices to turn a claim for unearned wages into an $800,000 windfall should 
be rejected. 
4 In fact, the third cause of action in Savage's Complaint asserts just such a claim. R. 11 at 
,r,r 41-45. In recognition that such a claim had no merit, Savage stipulated to dismissal of that 
claim with prejudice. R. 152-155. 
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E. Attorney's Fees on Appeal 
1. Savage is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees 
Savage claims entitlement to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-
615Error! Bookmark not defined., which provides that "[a]ny judgment rendered by a court 
of competent jurisdiction for the plaintiff in a suit filed pursuant to this section may include all 
costs and attorney's fees reasonably incurred in connection with the proceedings .... " (Emphasis 
added). That claim fails because the District Court did not enter judgment in favor of Savage. 
Even in the unlikely event that this case were to be remanded for further proceedings, Savage 
would not be the prevailing party as required for an award of fees under Idaho Code § 45-615 
because no judgment has been rendered in her favor, as required to an award of attorney's fees 
under Idaho Code§ 45-615. 
2. Scandit Should be Awarded Attorney's Fees on Appeal Because this Appeal 
has been Pursued without Foundation 
Scandit respectfully requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-121. An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is appropriate "when the court, 
in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Eagle Equity Fund, LLC v. TitleOne Corp., 
161 Idaho 355, 362-63, 386 P.3d 496, 503-04 (2016). 
Simply stated, Savage has no basis to pursue this appeal. The law in Idaho is well settled 
that an employee has no claim for "wages" unless and until the alleged wages are "earned" under 
the terms of the employment agreement. Savage's primary assertion on appeal - that the District 
Court "applied the wrong legal standard" by looking to "whether the commission is 'earned"' -
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is frivolous. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 34-35. That standard is firmly established as the law in 
Idaho as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Bakker. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Scandit respectfully asks the Court to affirm the District 
Court's dismissal of Savage's Complaint and award Scandit attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED THIS -L day of December, 2017. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
By r?ii, A,iip 
William K. Smith 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -l day of December, 2017, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
PO Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant] 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 31 
f)aU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
~ Email: ted@givenspursley.com 
D Facsimile: 208.388.1300 
49000.000 I.I 0216117.2 
